# Model Act on the Prohibition of Synthetic Closure in Decisions Binding a Natural Person **Short title.** Non-Integration Act. **Status.** Model legislative text, for transposition into a European code of administrative procedure and data protection, or into a common-law statute with a schedules power. It is written to stand beside Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, not to repeal them. Cross-references to "the GDPR" and "the AI Act" are to those instruments. Where this Act and those instruments both apply, compliance with those instruments is dealt with by section 48. **Drafting note.** Terms of art from the accompanying article — synthetic closure, the middle term, Konapsys — are not used as operative words. The operative words are completion, dependability, decoupled rationale, endogenous record, exogenous record, and re-ingestion. A court should be able to apply the Act without adopting the theory, and unable to apply the theory as a way around the Act. --- ## Recitals (1) A decision that changes the legal position of a natural person is an act of law only if it can be answered by that person in a form the decision-maker is not free to recode as a mere input. (2) Computational systems are capable of constituting a natural person as a case-variable and of determining an act on the basis of that constitution. Where they do so, the reasons given for the act tend to refer to the system itself: its validation, its objective, its score, its oversight log. Such reasons may be sincere. They do not reconnect the act to the person. (3) The opportunity to access, rectify, and receive an explanation of personal data, and the opportunity to obtain human oversight of a high-risk system, are necessary protections against mis-description. They are not a substitute for a limit on the competence to constitute a person as a case-variable. (4) A presumption that a system is dependable, and therefore that a decision which rests on it is supported, has no foundation in the law of evidence or in the law of reasons. Dependability is a property of tools. It is not a reason. (5) Pleadings and administrative filings are part of the way a legal order learns. Rules of intake that reject, delay, or penalize filings because they are not machine-readable, or because they contradict a score in words the score cannot encode, destroy the very variance on which that learning depends. (6) Records a decision-maker creates about its own compliance are not interchangeable with the record of a person's opposition to the decision. A legal order that treats them as interchangeable will satisfy itself and surprise itself. (7) The content of a person's interruption of a computational act is not a training resource. If it is used as one, the interruption ceases to be a legal act and becomes a label, and the next person is scored against the last person's victory. (8) These limits are jurisdictional. They are not a weighing to be struck case by case against the efficiency of the system. Procedure governs how a competent authority acts. This Act decides whether the authority is competent for the act. --- ## Chapter I — Purpose, scope, and definitions ### Section 1. Purpose The purpose of this Act is to prevent the completion of a natural person by a computational act, to abolish the presumption of dependability, to keep pleadings from being optimized out of the legal record, and to require that reasons which change a natural person's legal position reconnect to that person. ### Section 2. Scope (1) This Act applies whenever a computational act binds, or is about to bind, a natural person. (2) A computational act binds a natural person if it determines, in whole or in part, a decision that changes or is capable of changing that person's legal position, livelihood, liberty, family integrity, access to a subsistence benefit, access to education or a regulated profession, access to a core financial service necessary for ordinary economic life, or access to a principal public forum operated by a platform. (3) This Act does not apply to an ordering solely between computational systems, or solely between legal persons, until and unless that ordering binds a natural person within subsection (2). (4) This Act applies to public authorities and to private persons. A private person cannot be delegated, by contract or by market practice, a competence this Act withholds. (5) This Act applies without prejudice to any stronger protection in any other law. ### Section 3. Definitions In this Act — **"computational output"** means any score, ranking, classification, probability, recommendation, allocation, generated reason, or other product of an automated or partly automated system, including a product reviewed, approved, or lightly edited by a natural person after the system has constituted the case. **"completion"** means the constitution of a natural person as a case-variable within a computational representation, where that constitution determines a decision within section 2(2). A constitution determines a decision if the decision would not have been the same had the output been unavailable, or if the decision-maker cannot state the operative reason without relying on the output. **"constitutive quantification"** means any enrollment, profiling, embedding, scoring, or combination of personal data undertaken in order to complete a natural person, whether or not a final decision has yet been issued. **"dependability"** means any claim, metric, certification, or assurance that a system is accurate, robust, unbiased relative to a stated baseline, validated, widely deployed, state of the art, or conformant to a technical standard. **"decoupled rationale"** has the meaning given in section 25. **"endogenous record"** means any record generated by or for the decision-maker concerning the system itself, including validation studies, impact assessments, bias audits, oversight logs, explanation templates, vendor assurances, conformity assessments, and reports of targets met. **"exogenous record"** means the person's statement and evidence, the primary facts found by a body that is not the author or vendor of the system, and the determination of a court or tribunal under this Act. **"protected interruption"** means a refusal of enrollment, a challenge, a pleading, a hearing submission, an oral answer, or any other act by which a natural person resists a computational act, including the record of that resistance. **"re-ingestion"** means any use of the content of a protected interruption as a feature, label, weight, prompt, evaluation item, benchmark item, or other input to the training, fine-tuning, validation, or objective of a computational system. **"scheduled decision"** means a decision listed in Schedule 1. **"SEO routing"** means any use of a computational output to reject, delay, down-rank, triage away from a human hearing, or penalize in costs a pleading or application, on grounds of its form, its variance from a template, its predicted weakness, or its inconsistency with a score. --- ## Chapter II — Abolition of the presumption of dependability ### Section 4. The presumption is abolished (1) The presumption of dependability is abolished. (2) The presumption of dependability is the inference, express or implied, that because a system is dependable, a computational output of that system is prima facie evidence of a fact about a natural person, or is a sufficient reason for a decision that binds a natural person. (3) No court, tribunal, administrative authority, employer, creditor, platform operator, or other decision-maker shall draw that inference. ### Section 5. What abolition does and does not forbid (1) A decision-maker may use a computational system to perform an arithmetic, retrieval, or ordering operation whose terms the decision-maker has defined independently of the system and is prepared to defend without the system's output. (2) A decision-maker may not treat dependability as filling any element of a charge, a claim, a risk finding, a suitability finding, or a discretion. (3) Trade secrecy, intellectual property, and contractual confidence do not restore the presumption and do not excuse the duty to state a reconnecting reason under Chapter VI. A decision-maker who cannot state that reason without disclosing a protected weight must state it without the weight or withdraw the decision. It may not keep the decision and withhold the reason. ### Section 6. No bootstrapping (1) Conformity to the AI Act, certification by a notified body, completion of a fundamental-rights impact assessment, and publication of a transparency notice are facts in the endogenous record. (2) None of them restores the presumption of dependability. (3) Widespread market use of a system is not evidence that a decision resting on it is lawful under this Act. ### Section 7. Procurement and internal instruction (1) A term of a contract, procurement framework, or internal instruction that requires an official or employee to treat a computational output as presumptively sufficient is void. (2) An official or employee who declines to draw the presumption shall not be disciplined for that declination. --- ## Chapter III — Ultra vires completion ### Section 8. Completion is void (1) A decision within section 2(2) that is a completion of a natural person is void. (2) Voidness under this section is a want of competence, not a defect of weighting. It is not cured by showing that the output was accurate, explained, reviewed by a human being, or less restrictive than some alternative completion. ### Section 9. The right of non-integration (1) A natural person has the right not to be subjected to constitutive quantification for the purpose of a scheduled decision. (2) The right arises before enrollment. It is not dependent on a prior adverse output. (3) A scheduled decision shall be made, if it is made at all, on evidence and reasons that a competent human decision-maker can state and that the person can answer, whether or not a system assisted in the retrieval of documents or the arithmetic of figures already in evidence. ### Section 10. Enrollment (1) Constitutive quantification for a scheduled decision is unlawful even if no adverse decision has yet been issued. (2) A person who shows that enrollment is imminent, or continuing, is entitled to interim relief under section 42 without proving that the eventual output would be inaccurate. (3) Data already collected for a different, lawful purpose may be retained for that purpose. It may not be repurposed into constitutive quantification for a scheduled decision. ### Section 11. Rectification is not a substitute (1) The availability or the prior use of a right of access, rectification, explanation, human oversight, or contestation under the GDPR or the AI Act is not a defense to a claim under section 8 or section 9. (2) An offer to correct a feature, to provide a score explanation, or to run a human review is not performance of the right of non-integration. (3) A person may pursue rectification and a claim under this Act in the same proceeding. Success on rectification does not extinguish a claim of completion, and success on completion does not require the person to show that any feature was false. ### Section 12. Original standing (1) Standing under this Act is original to the natural person bound or about to be bound. (2) No expert certification that the person's situation is "non-computable," "unsuitable for automation," or of any similar character is a condition of standing or of interim relief. (3) The person is not required to propose an alternative system, an alternative feature set, or an alternative threshold. (4) Representative and collective proceedings may be brought under the ordinary law. The class must be defined as persons, not as a score band. --- ## Chapter IV — The one-way membrane ### Section 13. Mandatory exposure (1) Every computational act within section 2 shall be exposed to a protected interruption by the natural person concerned. (2) Exposure shall be real and prior where section 9 applies, and shall in every case be available before irreversible harm where harm of that kind is reasonably foreseeable. (3) An interruption that can be made only after the decision has taken effect is not exposure for the purposes of section 9. It may still ground nullification after the fact. ### Section 14. Ban on re-ingestion (1) The content of a protected interruption shall not be re-ingested. (2) The ban binds the original decision-maker, its processor, its vendor, any group undertaking, and any successor who receives the content from any of them. (3) Anonymization, pseudonymization, aggregation, and paraphrasing do not take content outside the ban if the content still functions as a feature, label, or evaluation item. (4) A person may consent to a specified research use of her own interruption. Consent must be particular, may be refused without detriment to the merits of her case, and may be withdrawn. A general clause in terms of service is not consent. Consent by one person is not consent for a class. ### Section 15. The derivative is ultra vires (1) A system is unlawful to the extent that it is designed, trained, fine-tuned, or evaluated so that the content of a protected interruption can change its parameters or its objective. (2) The unlawfulness is not cured by a penalty term, a regularizer, a fairness constraint, or a claim that the learning is beneficial to future persons. (3) It is a defense that the architecture makes the forbidden gradient impossible, not merely discouraged. The burden is on the operator. ### Section 16. Archive is not a training set (1) A decision-maker shall preserve, for the ordinary period of the legal archive, the computational output, the decision, and the fact and legal ground of any protected interruption. (2) Preservation under subsection (1) is for reconstructibility by the person, by a court, by a competent oversight body, and by a subsequent legislature. It is not a license to re-ingest. (3) A court may inspect the archive. Inspection is not re-ingestion. A court shall not order disclosure of archived content to a vendor for the purpose of improving a system. ### Section 17. Counts, not stories (1) Nothing in this Chapter forbids the publication of statistics that record only the number, statutory ground, and type of decisions nullified or enrollments refused under this Act. (2) A statistic becomes re-ingestion when it is built by coding the narrative content of interruptions finely enough to function as a feature of persons. --- ## Chapter V — Anti-SEO pleading safe harbors ### Section 18. The safe harbor (1) A pleading, application, appeal, or administrative filing by or on behalf of a natural person shall not be rejected, treated as incomplete, delayed relative to machine-readable filings, down-ranked, triaged away from a human decision-maker, or made the subject of an adverse costs order, solely because — (a) it is narrative in form; (b) it contains facts the intake schema has no field for; (c) it contradicts a computational output in terms the output cannot encode; (d) it is predicted, by any system, to be weak, repetitive, fraudulent, or unlikely to succeed; or (e) it is not machine-readable. (2) The safe harbor applies in courts, tribunals, administrative procedures, and in any private procedure by which a scheduled decision, or a decision within section 2(2), is reached or reviewed. ### Section 19. Lawful rejection (1) A filing may be rejected or required to be amended only on a legal ground independent of machine readability and independent of any computational output. (2) The ground shall be stated in writing, in ordinary language, and shall identify the rule of law relied on. (3) "Failure to use the portal," "unstructured annex," and "inconsistency with the risk score" are not legal grounds. ### Section 20. Forensic variance (1) Variance between a person's account and a computational output is a matter of evidence. It is not a defect of form. (2) A decision-maker shall not draw an adverse inference from the person's refusal to state her case in the categories the system supplies. (3) A person is entitled to put primary facts on the exogenous record in her own words, subject only to the ordinary limits of relevance, length set by a general rule of court, and the law of abuse of process. A length limit must be a general rule, not a prediction of the filing's worth. ### Section 21. No SEO routing (1) SEO routing is unlawful. (2) A system may be used, after a filing has been accepted into the human queue, to assist with page-number retrieval. It may not decide the queue. (3) Where a filing was subjected to SEO routing, the routing itself is a procedural violation. The decision-maker must place the filing in the human queue within five working days of the violation being raised, without a fresh completeness check of the kind section 18 forbids. ### Section 22. Costs and representatives (1) Where the sole defect relied on to reject, stay, or penalize a filing was a defect within section 18, any costs order against the person or her representative shall be set aside, and the person is entitled to her reasonable costs of resisting that defect. (2) A representative shall not be subject to professional discipline for refusing to recast a client's account into a form designed to be scored. (3) A representative who does recast an account shall preserve the client's unrecast statement on the exogenous record. Failure to preserve it is a breach of this section, and the client may put the unrecast statement in later as of right. ### Section 23. Tools used by the person A person or her representative may use computational tools to prepare a filing. Use of such tools does not waive section 18 and does not authorize SEO routing of the result. --- ## Chapter VI — Judicial review of decoupled rationales ### Section 24. Scope of this Chapter This Chapter applies to every decision within section 2(2), whether or not the decision is also a completion. A decision may be unlawful under this Chapter even if the authority had competence, because competence does not repair a bad reason. A decision that is a completion is already void under section 8, and this Chapter applies in the alternative. ### Section 25. Decoupled rationale (1) A rationale is decoupled if, and to the extent that, it justifies a decision by reference to a computational output, a metric, a threshold, a model objective, an institutional performance indicator, or an artefact in the endogenous record, and does not reconnect that reference to — (a) the legally protected interest actually engaged; and (b) the primary facts of the person's case, found on evidence. (2) A rationale reconnects only if a reader who has not seen the computational output can understand why this act was taken toward this person. (3) Words such as "risk," "integrity," "quality," "trust," and "compliance," used without primary facts, do not reconnect. They name the mandate. They are not a reason. ### Section 26. Inadmissibility (1) A decoupled rationale is inadmissible as the sole or principal justification of a decision within section 2(2). (2) Where the operative part of the reasons is decoupled, the decision is unlawful, even if a reconnecting reason is mentioned and is not the reason on which the decision in fact rests. (3) A court may look at the decision as made. It is not limited to the reasons as later rewritten for litigation. A reconnecting reason first offered in an advocate's skeleton, and not in the decision, is not the decision's reason. ### Section 27. Standard of review (1) Whether a rationale reconnects is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. (2) No margin of appreciation, no Wednesbury band, no "respectful deference to the technical assessment," and no distinction between process and substance applies to the reconnecting step. (3) The primary facts themselves, once lawfully found by a competent human decision-maker on evidence the person could answer, are reviewed on the ordinary standard of the forum. This Act does not invent a new standard for ordinary facts. It removes the computational output from the class of ordinary facts. ### Section 28. Burden (1) The decision-maker bears the burden of showing that the rationale reconnects. (2) The person does not bear the burden of showing that the output was wrong, unstable, or biased. (3) If the decision-maker cannot discharge subsection (1) without the output, it has not discharged it. ### Section 29. Deference withdrawn (1) A computational output is not a finding of fact entitled to deference. (2) A human reviewer who adopted the output, or who reviewed only the features the system presented, has not made an independent finding. The output remains the reason. (3) An expert instructed by the decision-maker to defend the system is a witness about the endogenous record, not a source of deference. ### Section 30. The record on review (1) The reviewing court shall separate the endogenous record from the exogenous record and shall say which it is using for which finding. (2) The endogenous record may prove what the system was and what the institution said about it. It may not, by itself, prove that the decision toward the person was justified. (3) Failure to keep the separation is a ground of appeal. ### Section 31. Intensity where completion is also alleged Where the person alleges completion under section 8 and, in the alternative, a decoupled rationale under this Chapter, the court shall decide competence first. If the decision is void for completion, the court need not reach the quality of the reasons, but may do so where a declaration would prevent recurrence. --- ## Chapter VII — Partition of records ### Section 32. Non-fungibility (1) The endogenous record and the exogenous record are not fungible. (2) An addition to the endogenous record is not a response to a protected interruption. (3) An authority that, in answer to an interruption, commissions a further audit, a further explanation, or a further oversight review, and does not answer the exogenous case, has not determined the interruption. Time for a lawful determination continues to run. ### Section 33. Thresholds for changing a legal position (1) No threshold, score, or stop-rule constituted by the endogenous record alone shall be a sufficient condition for a decision within section 2(2). (2) A threshold may be used as a clerk uses a checklist of documents already required by law ("is there a passport on the file"), where the checklist item is a primary document and not a score. (3) A statutory numerical condition enacted by a legislature (an age, a period of residence, a published monetary limit) is not a computational output merely because a machine applies it. It is a rule. The facts that go into it must still be primary facts. --- ## Chapter VIII — Remedies ### Section 34. Nullification (1) A decision void under section 8, or unlawful under section 26, shall be quashed, set aside, or declared of no effect, according to the procedure of the forum. (2) The court shall not remit the decision to be taken again on the same completion. Remittal, if any, shall direct a fresh decision made without the forbidden constitution. (3) Damages calculated by the distance between the output and a "truer" output are not the primary remedy and shall not be treated as an election that bars nullification. ### Section 35. Structural injunction (1) Where completion or SEO routing is systemic, the court may forbid the named constitution of persons for the named class of decisions, for a period or indefinitely. (2) The court may forbid re-ingestion of the record of the proceedings. (3) The order shall be specific enough for a reasonable official to know what must stop. It need not redesign the authority's systems for it. ### Section 36. Non-proportional reset (1) Where a person shows completion of a scheduled decision, the decision is set aside without any requirement to show that the error, the unfairness, or the deviation from the output was large. (2) A "harmless error" analysis keyed to the likely sameness of a fresh score is not available. Sameness of a fresh score is the vice, not a cure. ### Section 37. Interim relief (1) Interim relief is available where the person shows a real prospect that enrollment or a decision within scope is imminent or continuing, and that the balance of convenience, understood as including the irreversibility of completion, favors a stay. (2) The court shall not require a cross-undertaking in damages from a person seeking to prevent a scheduled decision, except for abuse. ### Section 38. No score-based cap Compensation for loss caused by an unlawful decision under this Act shall not be capped, reduced, or assessed by reference to the computational output, a risk band, or a prediction of what a lawful system would have done. Ordinary principles of causation and mitigation apply to primary facts. ### Section 39. Reopening (1) A person may apply to reopen a decision within scope taken in the five years before the commencement date, on the ground of completion or of a decoupled rationale. (2) Reopening is as of right for scheduled decisions. For other decisions within section 2(2), the court may refuse reopening if the person knew the facts and slept on them, or if reopening would destroy the rights of a third party who dealt in good faith and without notice of the completion. The authority's reliance on its own system is not a third-party right. (3) This section does not authorize re-ingestion of the reopened files. --- ## Chapter IX — Oversight, penalties, and interpretation ### Section 40. Competent court The ordinary courts and, where they exist, the administrative courts have jurisdiction. A data-protection authority may investigate re-ingestion and SEO routing and may order them to stop. It may not certify a system as conferring competence under this Act. No such certification shall be issued by any body. ### Section 41. Penalties for re-ingestion and SEO routing (1) Re-ingestion in breach of section 14 and SEO routing in breach of section 21 are sanctionable by the data-protection authority on the scale applicable to serious infringements under the GDPR, without prejudice to nullification and damages. (2) It is a defense to a monetary penalty, not to nullification, that the operator detected the breach, stopped it, and notified the affected persons within 72 hours of discovery. The defense is not available if the architecture made the breach likely. ### Section 42. Non-retaliation No person shall be subjected to a detriment for exercising a right under this Act, for filing a non-optimized pleading, or for refusing to draw the presumption of dependability. A detriment includes a change in score, priority, or queue position. ### Section 43. Interpretation (1) This Act shall be interpreted as a limitation of competence, not as a quality standard for systems. (2) Ambiguity shall be resolved against completion and against re-ingestion. (3) Nothing in this Act requires a decision-maker to ignore a danger to the life of a natural person that is evident on primary facts. Primary facts may always be acted on. A score predicting such a danger is not itself a primary fact. ### Section 44. Relation to human oversight duties A decision-maker who has complied with Article 14 or Article 86 of the AI Act, or with Article 22 of the GDPR, shall record that compliance in the endogenous record. The record is relevant to section 40 investigations of good faith. It is not a defense to section 8, section 9, section 14, or section 26. ### Section 45. Commencement and transition (1) Chapters II, V, and VI come into force 90 days after enactment. (2) Chapter III comes into force 180 days after enactment for scheduled decisions, and one year after enactment for other decisions within section 2(2). (3) Systems already deployed are not grandfathered. Section 39 governs past decisions. Continuing enrollment is a fresh act. ### Section 46. Schedules Schedules 1, 2, and 3 have effect. A legislature may amend Schedule 1 by express enactment and not by guidance, technical standard, or ministerial list. --- ## Schedule 1 — Decisions for which non-integration applies of its own force 1. A criminal sentence, a committal, a pre-trial restraint of liberty, or a condition of bail. 2. A decision to grant, refuse, suspend, reduce, or recover a subsistence benefit, a housing benefit, or a benefit on which the person and any dependent actually live. 3. A decision to remove a child from a person's care, or to refuse or terminate contact, other than an emergency removal justified at the time on primary facts of immediate harm and reviewed within 72 hours on those facts. 4. Exclusion or expulsion from compulsory education, or refusal or withdrawal of a license to practice a regulated profession. 5. Dismissal from employment, or a refusal to hire where the decision is a completion and the post is the person's ordinary means of life. (A human decision-maker may still refuse to hire on stated primary reasons. She may not adopt a completion.) 6. Refusal, revocation, or material pricing of a core payment account, a basic insurance required by law, or credit whose refusal cuts off ordinary economic life, where the refusal or the price is a completion. 7. Removal of a natural person from a platform that is, for that person, a principal public forum, or suppression of her speech on that platform equivalent to removal, where the act is a completion. (Ordinary moderation against a stated rule, applied by a human decision-maker to primary facts of the speech, is not a completion merely because a tool retrieved the speech.) A decision not on this list remains within section 2(2) where it in fact binds a natural person in the manner section 2 describes. The list is the class for which section 9 applies without a further showing of effect. ## Schedule 2 — What a reconnecting statement of reasons contains A statement of reasons reconnects if, and only if, it sets out in substance — 1. the legal power being exercised, cited to its source; 2. the protected interest of the person that the power touches; 3. the primary facts found, and the evidence on which each finding rests, in terms that do not require the reader to trust a computational output; 4. why those facts satisfy the legal test for this act; 5. what the person said in answer, and why it was accepted or rejected on the evidence; 6. a sentence stating whether a computational system was used and, if so, confirming that the system did not determine the act and was not treated as dependable within the meaning of section 4. Item 6 is an attestation, not a reason. It does not satisfy items 3 to 5. Its absence is a ground for requiring a fresh statement. Its presence is not proof of its truth. ## Schedule 3 — Notice to be printed on every intake portal and paper form for a decision within scope > You may tell us what happened in your own words. You do not have to use our categories. Your application will not be rejected, delayed, or moved down a queue because it is not machine-readable, because it does not match a score, or because a system predicts that it will fail. If we reject it we will tell you the legal rule we rely on. A score is not a legal rule. You have a right, in the cases listed in Schedule 1 of the Non-Integration Act, not to be scored as the basis of this decision at all. The notice shall appear before any checkbox. It shall not be shorten-able by the operator. A portal that will not accept a filing until the filer has passed a completeness check forbidden by section 18 is unlawful, notice or no notice. --- ## Drafting notes for a legislature (not operative) These notes are not text for enactment. The Act is deliberately redundant between section 8 and Chapter VI. Completion is a want of power. A decoupled rationale is a want of a reason even where power exists. Administrators will try to concede the second to save the first ("we had reasons, so we did not complete her"). Courts should decide section 8 first, as section 31 says, and should treat a reasons document that cannot be understood without the score as evidence of determination by the score. Schedule 1 item 6 will be lobbied hard. The accompanying article treats the boundary of credit as a genuine legislative choice, not as a deduction. A legislature may narrow item 6 to basic payment accounts and compulsory insurance and leave ordinary consumer credit to SCHUFA-style safeguards. It should do that by amending the Schedule expressly, not by guidance that restores the presumption through the side door of "proportionate use." The five-year reopening window in section 39 is a political number. What is not political, inside this design, is the refusal to cap compensation by the score. A cap of that kind would reintroduce the chart as the measure of the person at the moment of remedy. Section 15's defense — the forbidden gradient is impossible, not discouraged — will be described as technically naive. It is the point. A penalty in a loss function is a price, and prices are optimized. An architecture that cannot take the gradient does not offer the institution a bargain. Vendors who cannot or will not build that architecture are not competent counterparties for a scheduled decision. They remain free to sell systems for uses outside this Act.